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Binary opposition as an ordering principle of thought 
has, indeed, been a paradigm for modes of thinking 
in Western civilization. Doubtless, evolutionary 
biology has been pivotal in the deconstructing of 
radical binary oppositions. 
The history of non-evolutionary biology goes 
beyond the circle of fundamentalist Christian 
opponents of evolution. Long before Christianity, 
Greek philosophical anthropology assumed an 
atomistic worldview, paradigmatically expressed in 
Aristotle, sometimes in Plato, and given its modern 
character by Descartes. The primary binary opposition 
manifest in these thinkers, and more importantly, in 
the general ethos of their historical epoch, is the mind-
body dualism. 
The body is like any other natural entity, to be 
understood in atomistic-mechanistic language. The 
human soul, as a ghost in the machine, is incorporeal 
and spiritual in nature. 
Professor Sheets-Johnstone recognizes that this 
example of binary opposition gave rise to the situation 
wherein human beings are both essentially and morally 
segregated from God, animals, nature, and even each 
other. This foundational ordering principle established 
a justification for human tyranny over other creatures 
and the entire natural world. Much of the reign of 
tyranny over nature stems from outdated religious, 
biological, and metaphysical systems of thought. These 
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systems of thought maintain a radically hierarchical 
ontological and axiological structure erected to support 
humanity at its apex. In short, Western people have 
come to think in terms of isolated individuals and 
insulated minds, rather than in terms of One Reality 
ontologically interconnecting all things and events. 
In recent philosophy, anti-evolutionism is hard to 
find. It would seem that Sheets-Johnstone's thesis, that 
binary opposition as an ordering principle is refuted by 
evolutionary theory, is a moot point. In scientific and 
philosophically literate circles, the argument concerning 
non-evolutionary biology vs. evolutionary biology 
seems about over. With this in mind, what her paper 
does not fully provide are some precise ethical 
implications for human/nonhuman relations that would 
follow from dissolving binary opposition as an ordering 
principle of thought. For example, what is the moral 
status ofnonhumans relative to humans and to the whole 
biotic community, given the fact that continuity is a 
basic tenet ofevolutionary theory? In dissolving binary 
opposition, does it follow that we should dissolve any 
hierarchy of value among living entities? 
In addition to evolutionary theory, process 
philosophy has done an exemplary job in dissolving a 
number of binary oppositions by maintaining the view 
that reality is a socially structured process which 
manifests intimate continuities between nonhumans and 
humans. Yet, process philosophy maintains a modified 
hierarchy of value-experience, arguing that humans, by 
virtue of their superior ability to reason, do have a higher 
degree ofvalue than nonhumans. It follows that humans 
enjoy a higher level of moral status over nonhumans. 
But the difference in value between humans and 
nonhumans is one of degree, not kind. However, there 
may be no value distinction between higher animals 
and marginal cases of humanity. 
What, exactly, does Sheets-Johnstone espouse as 
an alternative metaphysical and moral worldview 
based on her rejection of binary opposition as an 
ordering principle? Ifcontinuity between humans and 
nonhumans is to be identified with absolute equality 
in moral status, I would have to disagree. 
Contrasts that stem from a hierarchical structure 
of value need not be invidious per se. The rejection 
of binary opposition is an attempt to raise the status 
of nonhumans, not lower the status of humans. In 
other words, there is nothing inherently mistaken, 
nor morally problematic, for humans to exalt and 
cherish their species. This becomes morally 
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problematic if this exaltation is celebrated at the 
expense of, or in violation of, nonhumans' basic 
needs and interests. 
Continuity does not imply strict equality. The value 
of any creature depends partly upon the effects it can 
have upon other creatures. In instrumental value, for 
better or worse, nonhumans are significantly less 
effective than humans. The key point here from the 
moral perspective is that acknowledgment of human 
superiority does not imply domination-quite the 
contrary. The human ability to apprehend the 
interconnections of the ecosystem and the intrinsic 
value of all things requires care, responsibility, and 
respect for nonhumans. A heightened level of 
compassion and respect for nonhumans comes from 
the very continuities and commonalities that are 
articulated in Sheets-Johnstone's paper. 
Process metaphysics, in concert with evolutionary 
theory, recognizes that sympathy and compassion are 
not merely psychological achievements; they are part 
of all lived experience. In addition, there is organic 
connectedness between desire and reason, feeling and 
self-consciousness, etc. In other words, thinking stems 
from sentience but blooms into the awareness of 
alternatives. Sentiency is the tie that binds human and 
nonhuman life. It is the only defensible boundary for 
having needs and interests at all. 
The continuity and commonality between humans 
and nonhumans established by organic connectedness 
should prompt us to see the necessity for ethical ideals 
to be undergirded by instinctive and emotional depth. 
Before justice and fair treatment is considered, human 
beings must feel their commonality with animals. 
Animals and humans are coevolved social beings 
participating in a single society, wherein all share 
feelings such as sympathy, compassion, trust, love, and 
so on. Springing from mind-body dualism, another 
classic Western binary opposition has been the radical 
separation of feeling and reason in moral philosophy, 
which, in tum, widens the gulf between humans and 
nonhumans. Feeling, compassion, sympathy, and the 
like are not bona Jute moral categories, according to 
rationalist orientations to ethics. Kantian ethics, for 
example, is derived from a mind-body dualism which 
leads to an invidious contrast between feeling and 
thinking. This dualism has led to truncated visions of 
human nature and, ultimately, to truncated moral 
philosophies. In short, it is a faulty attempt at human 
transcendence of animality. 
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However, for all the commonalities and kinship 
humans share with nonhumans, there still remains a 
hierarchy of value. Over and above plant life, at the 
level of animals and humans, there is a higher level 
known as consciousness and ultimately, in humans, the 
capacity to reason. 
Sheets-Johnstone rightly acknowledges that 
consciousness and thinking are common to humans and 
nonhumans, and are derivative from primitive feelings. 
Alfred North Whitehead adds to this by saying: 
Itmust be remembered, however, that emotion 
in human experience is not bare emotion. It is 
emotion interpreted, integrated, and trans-
formed into higher categories of feeling. But 
even so, the emotional appetitive elements in 
our conscious experience are those which most 
closely resemble the basic elements of all 
physical experience.! 
By acknowledging that reason stems from sentience, 
we delimit human transcendence of animality. However, 
it is not clear to me whether Sheets-Johnstone shares 
Tom Regan's view that any doctrine ofdegrees of value 
would lead to unjust subjugation of those possessing 
less value. Regan's claim is not convincing. It is not 
necessarily the case that a doctrine of degrees of value 
will lead to exploitation, although this often occurs. And 
there must be some grounds for adjudicating conflicts 
between humans and nonhumans. Ifconsciousness and 
sentiency establish value and moral status for 
nonhumans, then it would seem to follow that a higher 
degree of sentiency and consciousness (reason) would 
establish a higher moral status for humans. 
Human beings have achieved a level of con-
sciousness on the evolutionary scale which determines 
that reflective experience is more interesting, 
influential, and value-laden than the experience of 
nonhumans. Humans are able to grasp the universal 
nature of ideals and symbols, whereas animal 
consciousness is more closely tied to the primitive and 
physical mode ofexperience. Yet, as Susan Armstrong-
Buck points out, "... this same capacity of abstraction 
from the actual world allows human beings to forget 
their rootedness in their bodies and the world, as well 
as their kinship with nonhuman life. 111is disconnection 
results in the cruel and destructive behavior which 
human beings sometimes exhibit."2 According to 
Sheets-Johnstone, it is precisely this disconnection 
Between the Species 
Menta: Response 
resulting from radical binary opposition that human 
beings must overcome. 
We should be more hesitant to celebrate our 
unqualified "superiority" over animals, given the moral 
atrocities that have resulted from our capacity to 
"reason." Recall Mark Twain's remark that the beast is 
always clean-minded and innocent, whereas the human 
is always foul-minded and guilty. And in a remarkable 
passage, Whitehead states: 
Without doubt the higher animals entertain 
notions, hopes, and fears. And yet they lack 
civilization by reason of the deficient 
generality of their mental functioning. Their 
love, their devotion, their beauty of perform-
ance, rightly claim our love and tenderness in 
return. Civilization is more than all these; and 
in moral worth it can be less than all these.3 
Nevertheless, by maintaining the view that humans 
have more inherent value than nonhumans, we can 
adjudicate conflicts between humans and animals. 
But it does notjustify forcing sentient nonhumans to 
suffer unnecessarily. The consensus that human 
beings need to reach is when interference with the 
lives of nonhumans is necessary, hence, morally 
justifiable, and when it is notnecessary, hence, morally 
impermissible. 
At one point in her paper, Sheets-Johnstone claims 
that an absolute divide between humans and nonhumans 
ignores evidence of culture, mind, thinking, and 
reasoning in nonhumans. I suggest that culture and 
reasoning are not achievements found in the world of 
higher animals. Culture is a human achievement which 
springs from surveying the world with a large generality 
of understanding. It is the complex ofaims and interests 
which define and organize human social activity and 
its products. Cultural interests involve activities that 
are distinct from any activities found in the lives of 
animals. Art, morality, religion, science, and philosophy 
are examples of exclusively human social activities. 
Doubtless, nonhumans are remarkably social. But it 
would be more accurate to say that nonhumans enjoy 
social living rather than cultural living. 
The discussion on language perception and 
production illuminates striking commonalities between 
humans and nonhumans, but there is a difference, 
albeit one of degree, and this point is not fully 
explicated in Sheets-Johnstone's paper. All higher 
animals communicate, but the ability in nonhumans is 
significantly limited compared to that effected by human 
speech and writing. Most birds sing, but their music, 
while beautiful in its relative simplicity, is hardly 
comparable to human music in complexity, harmony, 
and intensity. 
In conclusion, Sheets-Johnstone offers sufficient 
evidence for rejecting any lingering appeals to binary 
opposition as an ordering principle and to the 
axiological schemes that follow. As I mentioned earlier, 
what her paper fails to do is to show what specific moral 
points follow from evolutionary continuity between 
humans and nonhumans. Nevertheless, it would appear 
that the careful refutation of any appeal to binary 
opposition as an ordering principle in human thought 
is an appropriate starting point for extending moral 
consideration to nonhuman animals. Human beings 
deserve moral consideration and humans, after all, can 
never fully transcend their animality. 
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